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The Importance of Tax Treaties
By DAVID S. FOSTER*
B.A., Amherst College, 1960; LL.B., Harvard University, 1963;former Inter-
national Tax Counsel and Director of the Office of International Tax Affairs,
US. Treasury Department; Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San
Francisco.
There are two ways of looking at tax treaties: they are either good
or bad. Tax treaties are good because they play a vital role in encour-
aging commerce between nations. Commerce between nations is good
because it raises the world's standard of living and helps international
understanding, leading to world peace. Tax treaties avoid double taxa-
tion. By definition the avoidance of double taxation is good. Tax trea-
ties prevent fiscal evasion. So who can be against tax treaties-
criminals?
Many people are against tax treaties. Tax treaties are considered
by many to be very bad. Tax policy is set by statute. If the policy
should be changed, the statute should be changed. Treaties make
piecemeal changes. It is an incredible waste of scarce governmental
resources to go around the world trying to negotiate and maintain a
network of tax treaties. Inevitably, a slipshod job will be done. Loop-
holes will be opened. Treaties will become outdated and will be
abused.
So which point of view is correct? In my view, both are correct.
Tax treaties are both good and bad.
There are two basic kinds of tax treaties: income tax treaties, and
estate and gift tax treaties. And there are two related kinds of tax trea-
ties: social security totalization agreements, which are not really trea-
ties but are executive agreements; and mutual assistance treaties.
At the last count that I made, we have twenty-eight basic income
tax treaties in force. Three of them have been extended to eighteen
territories, for a total of forty-six treaties. Four more were approved by
the Senate in November, 1981. And two more were favorably reported
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. My latest count indicates
that we have estate and/or gift tax conventions with twelve countries
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and one more was recently approved by the Senate with a minor
reservation.
Income, estate, and gift tax treaties have two basic purposes, the
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion. So-
cial security totalization agreements have the basic scheme that when
you are "bouncing around" between two countries, you should pay so-
cial security tax to only one country at a time, and you should receive
social security benefits from only one. Mutual assistance agreements
deal with catching criminals and prosecuting them. Since criminals are
involved in the tax area, mutual assistance agreements are related to
taxation.
I am not going to talk any more about social security or mutual
assistance agreements. Most of what I say will deal with income taxes.
Income tax treaties are obviously more important because our income
tax system is more important than our estate and gift tax system.
INCOME TAX TREATIES
For years, income tax treaties were negotiated by a fellow by the
name of Stanley King in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Then
they were negotiated by a fellow by the name of Nathan Gordon at the
Treasury Department. During the time that I was there, we set up the
Office of International Tax Affairs, which is made up of lawyers and
economists in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy.
They hang out in that building on the ten dollar bill. The difference
between the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service is like the dif-
ference between the Justice Department and the FBI. It is the Treasury
that has the responsibility for negotiating the tax treaties, not the IRS
and not the State Department. The Director of the Office of Interna-
tional Tax Affairs is the fellow who is in charge of treaty negotiations.
Since that office was set up, the Director has also always been the
International Tax Counsel, although in theory the Director could be an
economist as Nathan Gordon was. The Director has the responsibility
of getting the treaties negotiated and keeping everything in shape. So
he must determine which treaties are going to be negotiated. He must
set priorities and schedules,. communicate with the other nations, and
set up negotiating teams.
One would hope that this is all very scientifically done, but it is
actually very slipshod. Often, the treaty that you are negotiating hap-
pens to be with the country that just asked whether they could negoti-
ate with you. Or perhaps some commission somewhere wants to make
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closer ties with some other country. They have thought of several ways
in which this might be done, and the only feasible solution is by tax
treaty.
Other times a treaty is desperately needed; the German estate tax
treaty is such an example. Because there is no particular pressure for
the treaty, it is difficult to negotiate. Eventually the Director decides it
must be done and puts together a treaty negotiating team.
The core of the team on the United States side will be a lawyer
and an economist from the Treasury Department. Often there will also
be someone from the Internal Revenue Service. He might be from the
Office of Legislation and Regulations within the Chief Counsel's Office,
from the Office of the Assistant Commissioner Technical, or the IRS
representative located in a foreign country. For example, when negoti-
ating with France, usually a local IRS representative in Paris will at-
tend, and often there will be people from the State Department,
particularly when meeting overseas. The average U.S. team consists of
four people.
Treaty negotiations normally last a week at a time. You travel to
the country on a weekend, meet Monday through Friday, and usually
take Wednesday afternoon off for sightseeing. The schedule is fairly
light, something like nine to noon and two to four-thirty. It takes per-
haps four of those week-long sessions to conclude a typical treaty, but
often much more time is required. For example, I spent about eight
weeks working with Canada, and it then took approximately another
eight weeks after I left. The schedule was unusual. We did not take
time out for sightseeing. We started at eight in the morning and ended
about eight at night with about a half-hour for lunch. The sessions
were intensive, requiring a tremendous amount of work.
One not involved in the process naturally assumes that there is an
incredible amount of preparation for each of these treaty negotiations.
In fact, that is not the typical pattern. Normally, you throw a few
memos in your briefcase and read them in the plane on the way over.
Most of what you find out about the foreign country's tax laws, you
find out by asking them across the table, and they tell you and you
hope that it is right. Often, when you are in a foreign country, you
meet with local businessmen who do not want a treaty because they
think you will give a copy of their U.S. income tax returns to the for-
eign country, which in turn would quadruple their taxes.
The treaty negotiation process is a very personal process. At one
point when I was negotiating an estate tax treaty with Germany, the
chief negotiator left the room, and the second-in-command took over.
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We carefully negotiated a provision and worked it out so that we had it
all set. Then the chief negotiator for their side came back in and said,
"Oh no, come on now, you've been pushing all the wrong points. Now
we have to start over again." What the second-in-command thought
was German tax policy was different from what the first-in-command
thought was German tax policy.
While negotiating a treaty with Canada, we had to make a deci-
sion over a single word. The issue was whether we should use the word
"resident" or the word "enterprise" in the treaty. We argued back and
forth and finally gave up. I suggested that we toss a coin. We did toss a
coin, and the word "resident" won.
Most treaties are negotiated in English, and the text is usually in
English also. We negotiated with Tunisia in French, using interpreters,
but the text was in English. We negotiated with Yugoslavia using in-
terpreters; however, the text was not in English. We used two different
texts, and each time we suggested treaty language, the interpreter had
to translate the language that we suggested into Yugoslavian and then
have them consider it. It was very time-consuming.
I believe the negotiations between France and India took place in
English using an English text. At the end the French said, "Well, okay,
we've got to translate this into French, and then we'll sign the English
and the French text." And the Indians said, "Well, that's just fine, of
course, but you know we have to translate it into Hindi, also, so then
we'll sign Hindi, English, and French texts." And France then said,
"Oh, we're sorry but we have a rule that we can only sign treaties in
two languages and one of them has to be French. So you have your
choice. We'll either sign in French and English or French and Hindi."
As a consequence, there is no income tax treaty between France and
India.
I have another language story that turned out a little better. Can-
ada and Afghanistan negotiated a treaty in English. When they were
through, the Canadians said they had to translate it into French and
had to sign in both English and French. The Afghans said that they
needed to translate it into Pushtu for signature. A few months later, the
Afghans indicated that they also had to translate it into Dari Persian
for signature. A few months later they indicated that they also had to
translate it into Uzbek for signature. The Canadians said, "That's fine,
go right ahead." And then six months later, the Afghans came back
and said, "Gee, we have been working on it, and we can't translate it
into either Dari Persian or Uzbek." So the treaty was signed in Eng-
lish, French, and Pushtu.
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Treaties take a long, long time. I started working on the Philip-
pine tax treaty in about 1974, and it is still in the Senate in 1982. The
treaty was signed in 1976. The basic problem, of course, is that the
laws change as time goes on. People are upset that the Philippine tax
treaty does not take the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act
of 1980 into consideration. How could it, when it was signed in 1976?
The United Kingdom Estate and Gift Tax Treaty was negotiated
in a record time of two weeks. I initialed the treaty in June of 1977.
However, it took quite a while to translate it into English. It was finally
signed in October of 1978, and then it was another year before it be-
came effective. That two-and-a-half year negotiation was remarkably
quick; it often takes ten or twenty years. The Netherlands treaty nego-
tiation has been going on for approximately fifteen years.
One day I sat down at the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in Paris and the fellow next to me said,
"Oh, how do you do, Mr. Foster?" And I said, "How do you know
me?" And he said, "Well, your picture was on the cover of Taxes Mag-
azine." I said, "Taxes Magazine! What are you reading Taxes Maga-
zine for?" He said, "Well, I'm on the Dutch team for negotiating with
the United States." I said, "There's no negotiation going on." He said,
"Oh, yes, there is. It started over five years ago." I think perhaps they
prepare a little bit better than we do.
MODEL TREATIES
There are many model treaties. In the broad sense, they are all the
same. The basic model income tax treaty is the 1963 OECD Treaty.
That model was updated in 1977. We have a U.S. model treaty, and we
have a United Nations (U.N.) "less developed country" model treaty.
There are some Andean country treaties, but those above are the basic
models.
The United States became a member of the OECD shortly before
the 1963 model text was finished. The United States paid little atten-
tion to the 1963 model. The U.S. had a secret model which was main-
tained by the Legislation and Regulations Branch of the Chief
Counsel's Office. It was very long and complex.
The basic theory was that no one can understand the OECD
terms. They are very strange, with no meaning in U.S. law. You have
to use the precise U.S. terms. For example, you cannot use the term
"alienation of property." You have to say "sale or exchange of a capi-
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tal asset." Any fool knows that. You cannot use the term "enterprise;"
you have to use "resident."
While I was involved in the development of the 1977 model treaty
at the OECD, I discovered that those things that we kept saying about
precision were not really true. Furthermore, I found that whenever I
negotiated with another country and continually explained why ours
was better, I never really believed it, because it was not really true. I
was the one who won the toss and got "resident" in the Canadian treaty
when it really should have been "enterprise." I was stating the party
line, which was that no one in the United States can understand what
"enterprise" means. The word "artiste" is another one of those prob-
lematic words. Everyone knows that the word "artiste" means some-
body that paints pictures, until you read the dictionary definition. And
the dictionary in fact says that an artiste is an entertainer. We decided
we could not use the word "artiste." Rather, we have to use the word
"entertainer." Unfortunately, arguing over words slows down the
treaty negotiations, and concern over such details is hard to
understand.
As a consequence, when I was at Treasury, we developed the U.S.
Model Income Tax Treaty, which started with the 1977 OECD model
and tried to make only those changes which were to reflect peculiar
U.S. concepts where we needed special language. For instance, in the
United States, we tax citizens no matter where they are resident. This
is a special problem, and so we need a special solution for it. We cur-
rently have a special problem dealing with the Foreign Investment in
Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA), and that requires a special provi-
sion. In my opinion, it is unnecessary to use the precise word "enter-
tainer" or the precise phrase "sale or exchange of a capital asset."
I also discovered that using U.S. concepts sometimes gets us in hot
water. As an example, the Canadian Income Tax Convention which
was signed in 1942 refers to the sale or exchange of a capital asset. The
basic concept is that a U.S. citizen cannot be taxed by Canada on the
sale or exchange of a capital asset unless he is living in Canada. Many
years later, Canada started imposing a tax on the appreciation in prop-
erty at the time of gift or death. Everyone knows, of course, they
should not be collecting this tax from U.S. residents. If we had used
the general treaty language that they cannot tax the "alienation of
property" rather than the precise language, we would not have had this
problem. But no, we were very careful and precise. We said "sale or
exchange of a capital asset," and so we were in hot water.
This is a frequent problem. We had a special article in the U.S.
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model on source rules which was very confusing to foreign countries.
They do not understand what source rules are. The U.S. model now
intersperses them throughout, and the other countries are cognizant of
them. The OECD now has most of the source rules, and we recently
made slight changes to the source rules in our model.
We never liked the OECD associated enterprises article. The asso-
ciated enterprises article is basically like section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code. It says that the tax authorities can come in and make
adjustments between related parties and make it all come out right.
We always said that does not really do the job. The article is too long
and it is not precise enough. We tried to write the 482 regulations into
the treaty, which was disastrous. We changed it so that we use the
OECD language with a proviso at the end which says we can also use
section 482. It saves a lot of arguments.
We now have a 1978 U.S. model that has been published and a
proposed 1981 model. In addition, we have a separate proposed
amendment to article 16 that came out in December, 1981, and a model
estate and gift tax convention that was published in 1980, together with
a technical explanation.
Older treaties had regulations explaining them. The regulations
were produced slowly, and therefore were obsolete before they could be
applied. It is hard enough to get the Internal Revenue Service to come
out with regulations under FIRPTA. It is much more difficult to get
them to come out with regulations under a treaty with Bangladesh.
Therefore, about ten years ago the IRS stopped writing treaty regula-
tions. Instead, we have technical explanations. Shortly after a treaty is
signed, the Treasury Department prepares a technical explanation
which is submitted to the Senate, and it becomes part of the legislative
history. Then whenever there is an amendment to the treaty, there is a
technical explanation of the amendment.
TREATIES WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
I also spent some time at the U.N. when I was with the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The U.N. had a series of meetings between developed and
developing nations in which they tried to work on the basic OECD
model and come up with changes that were acceptable to developing
countries. This was accomplished, resulting in another published
model.
There has been talk about a U.S. developing country model, and I
believe there is an unpublished model. When the U.S. negotiates with
No. 3]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
a developing country, the U.S. tends to accept higher withholding tax
rates and a somewhat more expansive definition of "permanent estab-
lishment." The U.S. is against tax sparing and against the investment
credit for foreign investment, although President Reagan now wants an
investment credit for investment in the Caribbean.
Germany has two model treaties, both of which are secret, one for
developed countries and the other for developing countries. They are
very different. The United States has a lot of trouble negotiating trea-
ties with developing countries because other countries, particularly
Germany, are very generous with their treaty policy. But recently the
United States has started doing fairly well in such negotiations.
We have a treaty with Trinidad and Tobago that has been around
for some time. We had a treaty with Honduras which we lost. There is
a treaty with Morocco, which is another one of these cases. It was ne-
gotiated ten or fifteen years ago, and then the treaty teams on both
sides ceased working on it, and I was left trying to figure out what to do
with it. Later, we dusted it off and figured, "Oh well, why not sign it?"
We signed it in 1977, and it took about five years before it was finally
approved by the Senate. It went into force on January 1, 1981. We
also have treaties with Jamaica, one with Argentina that should go into
effect soon, one with Bangladesh, Egypt, Israel, Malta, and the Philip-
pines. So we have a fairly good record lately in the developing country
area.
In South America we have had more trouble. We got and lost
Honduras. We tried very hard for Brazil and have not managed to get
it. We had tried for Costa Rica every once in a while but have pretty
much given up. We now have, however, Argentina. When I came to
the Treasury Department, there was very little public involvement in
the treaty process. Basically, there was a secret model, and the secret
model was varied by putting the foreign country's name at the top of
the treaty and sending it to them. Once there, it was negotiated, ini-
tialed, translated, sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, who sent it to
the Secretary of State, who had it signed. Then it was sent to the Presi-
dent, who then sent it to the Senate, which sent it to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, and then when they got around to it, they released the
text. That was the first time the public got involved in the process.
The first thing I did was try to release the text earlier, immediately
upon signing. Although that is not much faster, it may be a year ear-
lier. There is no reason why it should not be released after it is signed.
Also, while I was there we started publishing the model.
Shortly after I left, the Treasury Department started having public
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hearings. Those have become very popular and prevalent. We used to
announce an upcoming treaty negotiation and take written comments
or talk to people on the telephone, but now there is a public meeting
where the Treasury representative explains the problems he sees and
what is likely to occur. People around the room can say, "Well, haven't
you taken this into account?" and then there is a dialogue. Those meet-
ings now take place not only in the beginning but also later on during
the negotiating process. It is very hard to have public involvement in
what is basically a negotiation, but we have been moving that way. I
think these changes are good, and I think the situation is getting better.
BASIC TREATY ISSUES
Now I will talk about a couple of basic treaty issues. Non-discrim-
ination is one issue I'd like to dwell on for a moment. In the model
treaties, there is typically a prohibition against a country levying taxes
on residents of the other country on a discriminatory basis, ie. more
burdensome than on their own residents. The U.S. has always felt very
strongly about that provision and insisted that it be in any treaty. But
of course it is not in all of our treaties.
A particular treaty it is not in is the treaty with Australia. There is
a basic problem with our treaty with Australia in that there is no reduc-
tion in the withholding tax on royalties, yet Australia has a very high
withholding tax on royalties. Australia has come to the United States
and said, "We would be delighted to reduce that by treaty. No prob-
lem, just sign right here." The United States responds, "Oh, no, we
cannot amend the treaty unless you are willing to accept a non-discrim-
ination article." Then Australia says, "We are not willing to accept a
non-discrimination article," and so nothing happens.
There is a similar problem with Canada. The existing treaty with
Canada prohibits discrimination against individuals but does not pro-
hibit discrimination against corporations. The U.S. position was that
there should be a broad non-discrimination clause. There is a drafting
problem with the non-discrimination clause. The OECD model and
the U.S. model are fairly explicit about what non-discrimination
means. Canada, however, practices a particularly invidious type of dis-
crimination which is not prohibited by the typical clause; Canada de-
nies a deduction for advertising on U.S. television stations that are
aimed at Canada. This is not prohibited by the U.S. model treaty, and
it is not prohibited by the proposed new income tax treaty with Ca-
nada. As a result, many people are very critical of that treaty.
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What actually happened in the Canadian case was that Canada
agreed to the basic principle that they should not discriminate against
U.S. corporations or individuals but with some exceptions. I think that
goes a long way, and we should be satisfied with that. But others don't
agree. We used the same approach in the Philippines. The Philippines
does not like non-discrimination clauses. We got them to agree to one
with listed exceptions.
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
Now I would like to discuss the issue of exchange of information.
I mentioned earlier that U.S. citizens who are abroad dislike exchange
of information provisions. They always are afraid that their U.S. in-
come tax returns will be given to the foreigners. Normally that does
not happen. The Treasury people try to reassure people that when the
foreign tax authorities have reason to believe there is a specific item not
being reported correctly, they then specifically request verification for
that item by the taxpayer. So there is a problem, but it is not on quite
as broad a scale as people fear.
There is a problem in the trade secrets area. The typical language
states that the exchange of information shall not be done in a way that
will reveal trade secrets. It is very hard to figure out what to do in
practice. Normally, if the United States sends information to France,
for instance, France is under an injunction that they will not publish
that information nor will they give it to unauthorized people. They will
keep it secret, but only in accordance with the procedures of their inter-
nal laws. It is not very comforting if France uses the information to
bring a court case, and they have to reveal the information in open
court. As a result, everyone finds out about it. You also get nervous
that French government-owned businesses may be able to get informa-
tion from the French tax authorities even if it is not generally available
to the public.
There is a basic problem because the taxpayer does not even find
out in a typical case that information is being exchanged. Many tax-
payers will not give information to the government if they have any
reason to suspect that it will be transferred to a foreign government. In
Germany, for example, a procedure has been worked out that Ger-
many cannot give the United States information without informing the
taxpayer and giving him an opportunity to object.
Now let us turn to the "competent authority" provision. In the
treaties there is an article about competent authority which says if any
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problem should arise in the administration of the treaty, the competent
authorities of the two jurisdictions shall get together and work it out.
This is a provision that people cannot really believe is an effective one,
but it is. The typical situation might involve a U.S. company and its
Canadian subsidiary. The parent company buys a widget from the
subsidiary for five dollars. The U.S. government goes in and says that
widget was not worth five dollars, it was only worth two dollars.
Therefore, when the U.S. parent company sold it for twenty dollars, it
didn't have fifteen dollars of income, it had eighteen dollars of income.
So the IRS claims a deficiency. Then someone from the Canadian sub-
sidiary goes into the Canadian tax authorities and says, "Well, look, I
reported income of five dollars, but it was really two dollars." The tax
authorities say, "That's too bad, you reported five dollars. It's five dol-
lars." As a result, the Canadian subsidiary then invokes the competent
authority mechanism, and the Canadian and U.S. tax authorities get
together and hammer it out in a room and they say is it five dollars or is
it two dollars and they agree on perhaps three fifty. Thus each of the
tax authorities has made an equivalent adjustment.
There are problems with the competent authority mechanism. It
does not always work smoothly. It takes time, the statute of limitations
must be kept open, and you have to be on good terms with your tax
inspector. Basically, the U.S. Office of International Operations has
two faces. When they are auditing the taxpayer's return, they will set
up enormous deficiencies and try rigorously to require compliance, but
when the tax inspectors are in the competent authority context, they are
trying to be the taxpayer's friend and trying to recover the U.S. tax-
payer's money from the foreign government.
Several U.S. treaties contain an article dealing with the problem of
treaty corporation use by third-country nationals. Basically, most of
those provisions don't work, but the problem is a real one, and people
worry about it. It is fine if you have Netherlands Antilles investors who
are investing in the United States, and the United States and the
Netherlands Antilles agree to carve up the revenue in a particular way
so as to avoid double taxation and thus reduce the withholding tax. It
is a little different, however, when you have a third-country national
coming in to form a Netherlands Antilles company which is really just
a shell. It has no independent substance, yet it is making use of that
treaty.
On December 23, 1981, proposed article 16 entitled "Investment or
Holding Companies" was published. The basic language of the article
provides that a corporation which is a resident of a contracting state
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shall not be entitled under this convention to relief from taxation in the
other contracting state, with respect to an item of income, gain, or
profit, unless the corporation establishes one of three things. The first
is that its stock is publicly traded on a securities exchange in that coun-
try. The second is that it is not controlled by third-country nationals.
The third is that the establishment of that corporation or the way that it
is carrying on business is not for the principal purpose of getting the
treaty advantage.
This is a very controversial provision. It is carefully drafted to
allow international finance subsidiaries to continue. The typical situa-
tion involves a U.S. parent company borrowing abroad, and not want-
ing to pay a thirty percent withholding tax on the interest. So a Nether-
lands Antilles subsidiary is established. The Netherlands Antilles sub-
sidiary borrows from third parties abroad and then lends the funds to
the United States parent. Under the treaty there is zero withholding on
the interest paid to the Netherlands Antilles, and there is a very small
tax collected in the Netherlands Antilles. The typical treaty language
would say that you do not get the reduced withholding tax in that cir-
cumstance because Netherlands Antilles people do not own the corpo-
ration resident in the Netherlands Antilles. The article 16 language
says that you do get the reduced withholding tax because Americans
own the Netherlands Antilles company. I do not know where that is
going to go, but it is a fairly hot issue.
ESTATE TAX TREATY ISSUES
I will close with references to two estate tax treaty issues. One
treaty mentioned before is the German estate and gift tax treaty. There
was a particular problem when Germany imposed a transfer tax on
death some years ago. The typical U.S. executive who went to work for
a subsidiary in Germany for three or four years and died in Germany
was technically subject to estate tax in Germany. Typically, all of his
assets would be shares in U.S. companies. We have a U.S. foreign tax
credit mechanism that allows a credit for foreign death duties, but it
applies only if the property is foreign property. So, typically, there
would be no credit. Germany did not allow a credit either, so it was
possible to have a tax exceeding 100%. The typical answer was the
"dark of night" theory-when someone dies, you bundle him up in a
suitcase, ship him back to the United States, and report that he died in
the United States and not in Germany, and Germany never knows
about it. That is a very bad way to operate, but because it was working,
there was little pressure for the treaty. But I was very anxious to get
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that treaty in place and we finally did. Now, in that case, there would
be no German estate tax.
The last issue deals with the United Kingdom estate tax treaty, a
very current issue. The factual situation involves a U.K. domiciliary
who sets up a trust with a U.S. life beneficiary, U.S. remaindermen,
U.S. trustees, and U.S. property. The trust was set up perhaps fifty
years ago; the life tenant is getting old, and it is suspected that he will
die soon. The U.K. internal law imposes a death tax on the death of a
life tenant, in contrast to U.S. law. In addition, whenever you have a
U.K. settlor, that is sufficient to justify a U.K. tax even if that is the
only contact. I have a recollection of having negotiated that provision
and concluded that the U.K. could continue to do that, although now
on reflection it is hard to see why. What has happened is this life ten-
ant has a New York law firm which has gone to the Treasury Depart-
ment and said that this is unfair. The Treasury Department has sent a
letter to the U.K. Inland Revenue saying, "This is unfair. Let us have a
protocol to the treaty." U.K. Inland Revenue has come back and said
that the issue was specifically considered in the treaty negotiations, and
it was one that the U.K. won, so it should be left that way. Now the
U.S. side is coming to me to see if I can remember, but I cannot recall it
very well. I walked out without any notes and everyone else who was
there was sick that day. But this is what treaties are all about.
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